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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE FAMILY HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AT LAW as the basic unit of
society.1 Under certain circumstances, the state must alter the struc-
* The author wishes to acknowledge the conscientious assistance of Professor
Robert J. Willey of the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univer-
sity, and of Ms. Enid L. Zafran, Esq., Cleveland State Law Review Editor, 1981-82.
' See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (at least clear and convincing
evidence needed for permanent termination of parental rights); Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (due process does not require appoint-
ment of counsel for indigents in every termination proceeding); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a liberty
interest protected by fourteenth amendment); Smith v. Organization of Foster
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ture of the family by terminating the parents' rights to the custody and
control of their children.2 When doing so, the state must recognize what
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (upholding some due process rights for foster parents);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (zoning
ordinance which narrowly defined family as excluding appellant's grandson
deprived appellant of liberty); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (mandatory maternity leave rule held to violate due process); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas criminal abortion statute held to violate due process);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (where parents had raised children together
a statute presuming unwed father was unfit parent violates equal protection);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute making it a felony to give con-
traceptive devices to unmarried person held to violate equal protection clause);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish protected by free exercise clause
of first amendment from compulsory school attendance statute); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation statutory scheme held to violate equal pro-
tection and due process clauses); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates right to marital privacy); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing for mandatory steriliza-
tion of habitual criminals violates basic right to marry and procreate); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute mandating public school
education for all children unconstitutional as it deprived parents of educational
choice); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding the teaching
of subjects in a language other than English deprives parents of right of choice
in child's instruction). The Supreme Court has become increasingly involved in
the family area. See Burt, The Constitution of The Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REV.
329, which states:
Family relations have become a substantial part of the Supreme Court's
constitutional concerns. In the 1978 Term alone, the Court addressed
the constitutional rights of pregnant children to obtain abortions without
parental consent, of illegitimate children to intestate inheritance under
state law, of fathers to bar adoption of their illegitimate children, of
mothers to obtain federal Social Security support for their illegitimate
children, and of husbands to equal claims to alimony from their wives
in divorce proceedings.
Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted).
2 A termination proceeding allows the state to intervene by removing the
child from the custody of the parents and placing the child in an environment
which should provide more security and safety.
The termination proceeding, therefore, is an essential legal mechanism
for assuring to a child his right to a "psychological parent", in cases where
his natural parent has failed to establish a loving and caring relation-
ship. While this need of the child to remain with the psychological parent
lacks the venerable legal credentials of the natural parent's hereditary
right to the child, it is an interest that is being increasingly considered
and recognized by the courts.
Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Paren-
tal Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530, 537 (1976) (footnote omitted). For a discus-
sion of alternatives that still provide the child with contact with the natural family
see Derdeyn, Rogoff & Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Paren-
tal Rights After Long-Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (1968), where the
authors argue that, "The absoluteness of termination of parental rights can in
some instances be modified to afford stability to the foster or adoptive family,
without necessarily costing the child continuity with his or her biological family."
Id. at 1188.
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has been termed the fundamental right of family integrity as derived from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 Additionally, the
state must recognize its duty to provide services to its dependent,
neglected, abandoned and abused children, who have a right to live in
an environment where they may grow and develop without serious harm
being inflicted upon them by their parents.4
I See Note, The Right To Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach
to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEo. L.J. 213, 214 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Family Integrity], which states:
A series of Supreme Court decisions dating from the early part of this
century indicates that various rights incident to establishing and main-
taining family are basic to our society. Members to our society are
afforded the constitutional right to marry, to procreate, to decide whether
or not to bear or beget a child, to direct the upbringing of the children,
and to choose family living arrangements. These decisions of the Supreme
Court suggest that, in addition to the specific individual rights of parents,
the Constitution protects the right of the family as a unit to be free
from arbitrary state interference. Indeed several lower federal courts
have explicitly recognized the existence of a fundamental right to family
integrity.
Id. at 213-14 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp.
10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) where the court found
that "[parents] have a fundamental right to family integrity." Id. at 15.
The fundamental right of family integrity focuses on the parental rights to
custody and control of their children and has been supported by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). "The
states right-indeed, duty-to protect minor children through a judicial deter-
mination of their interests in a neglect proceeding is not challenged here." Id.
at 649. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545
F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). "It cannot seriously be disputed that the state seeks
to further a legitimate state interest when it sets out to protect the welfare of
its citizens of tender age." Id. at 22. See also Note, Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights: The Need For Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 AM. U.L. REV.
771 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Clear and Convincing] (state has special interest
in children as they are vulnerable. Id. at 777); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Realistic Standards] (state has an obligation to pro-
tect children where parents are inadequate. Id. at 989); Family Integrity, supra,
at 216 (state intervenes as a result of its parens patriae authority over children).
4 The state may provide other forms of intervention when it determines that
the parental rights need not be terminated. See Clear and Convincing, supra note
3, at 771-72. Child abuse and neglect has become increasingly more disconcerning
to scholars as well as to the general public. In order to effectuate the state obliga-
tion to care for its children in need, all states have enacted neglect statutes. See
Katz, Howe & McGath, Child Neglect Laws in America 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975) (a
catalog of these statutes and tables highlighting differences).
It is beyond the purpose of the Note to examine the differences existing among
neglect and termination statutes. The issues to be addressed by this Note relate
to permanent, not temporary, custody proceedings, for it is in permanent ter-
mination proceedings that a parent's rights are forever severed.
The state may attempt to provide therapeutic or other aid to the family prior
to termination. See Note, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches,
18 J. FAM. L. 115 (1979), where the author states:
19821
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Whenever the state petitions for permanent custody of a child, it is
the responsibilty of the court to reconcile properly the fundamental right
of family integrity with the state's duty to care for its children in need.'
For the court to grant a petition for permanent custody it must order
that the parental rights be permanently terminated This order ends the
parent-child relationship and frees the child for possible adoption Courts
exercise much caution when granting an order for permanent termina-
tion because of the irreversible nature of the order.' The permanent ter-
mination proceeding is governed by state statutes which control the
All states support child protective services to help families with prob-
lems that effect the ability to act as a proper parent. Protective services
focus on rehabilitation and treatment of the conditions which motivate
maltreatment and aim to effect constructive change within the family,
and thereby improves the child's environment. Thus, the child protec-
tive services agency has several responsibilities: (1) to intervene when
apparent child maltreatment occurs; (2) to investigate and determine facts;
(3) to assess the harm and future risk to the child; and (4) "to initiate
appropriate services to remedy the situation."
Id. at 137 (footnotes omitted). But see Note, Parent and Child-Duty of the State
to Provide Supportive Services to a Parent Before Terminating the Parent's Rights,
14 J. FAM. L. 341 (1975) (state not obligated to provide support services to parent
before terminating parental rights).
I The focus of the state once the parental rights have been terminated will
be to locate a stable environment for the child. An adoptive setting would cer-
tainly be preferred; however, some children are destined to spend their childhood
and adolescence in foster care or institutional placements. See Ketcham & Babcock,
supra note 2.
' An order for the permanent termination of parental rights is an extreme
remedy. It is always hoped that the child will be placed in an environment which
will prove to be more secure and consistent than the one from which he has been
removed. For a discussion of the rationale for termination see Ketcham & Babcock,
supra note 2, at 537-43.
Id. at 543.
8 See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in
Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as State Intervention].
When parental rights are terminated, the parent loses not only physical
custody but also the right to ever regaining custody. Depending on the
specific statutory schemes, which vary significantly, the issue of termina-
tion can arise in three different types of.proceedings: (a) in the disposi-
tional phase of a neglect proceeding; (b) in an adoption proceeding where
the issue is whether the natural parent has to consent to the adoption;
and (c) in a special hearing at which termination is the only issue. Pro-
ceedings under (a) can occur only in conjunction with a finding of neglect,
whereas type (b) and (c) proceedings require no prior adjudication of
neglect.
Id. at 633 (footnotes omitted). For a description of permanent termination as an
"extraordinary judicial remedy," see Basky, Alternative Standards for the Ter-
mination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
[Vol. 31:679
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numerous factors courts must consider when granting an order for per-
manent termination.
All states have enacted statutes relating to child abuse, neglect,
dependency, abandonment and the termination of parental rights.' These
statutes require the reporting, to local officials, of child abuse, a very
serious problem which can lead to the termination of parental rights."0
Termination of parental rights statutes also provide guidelines for what
the state must prove in order for the court to grant the state's petition
for custody. In addition, these statutes usually provide for a certain stan-
dard of proof which the state must bear." The court cannot order a ter-
mination of parental rights if the state fails to meet the statutory or judi-
cially adopted standard of proof.
Prior to Santosky v. Kramer," decided by the United States Supreme
Court on March 24, 1982, three standards of proof were considered ap-
propriate by state legislatures: preponderance of the evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, and evidence convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.
The decision in Santosky mandates that states use at least clear and con-
vincing evidence as the standard of proof in proceedings to permanently
terminate parental rights."
This Note advocates the use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights permanently. The
Note will commence with background considerations such as the authority
of the state to terminate parental rights, the rights of the parties involved
in a termination proceeding and a discussion of standards of proof. Con-
sideration will also be given to the factors which should have an impact
on the standard of proof in permanent termination proceedings. These
factors include: the vagueness of termination statutes, the fundamental
right of family integrity, the broad discretionary powers of the courts
involved, the need for human service agencies to focus on serving the
family as a unit and the symbolic value of the standard of proof. The
argument will be made that the use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard in these proceedings is appropriate given the interests involved,
the needs of the child and the realities of what can be called the termina-
tion system.
9 For an overview of these statutes, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4.
I' See Note, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J.
FAM. L. 115 (1979).
" See generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4.
12 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Santosky dealt with the New York termination statute,
and provided the Court with its first opportunity to determine the appropriate
standard of proof in termination proceedings. The Court held that at least clear
and convincing evidence must be offered to support the termination petition.
Dissenting, Justice Rhenquist, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, and Chief
Justice Burger, argued that the case dealt with the area of family law, an area tradi-
tionally left to the states. Id. at 770-91.
" Id. at 768-70.
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II. STATE AUTHORITY
A. Historical Overview
In the 1700's, legal scholars in the United States developed theories
to support the termination of parental rights through state intervention
in family matters. 4 One theory advocated the use of parens patriae
authority. Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country."15 It
is a doctrine with roots in English common law that date back to feudal
times." The early application of state authority under this doctrine in-
volved state aid to the poor. 7 Later, the needs of destitute children were
addressed by the state through the rationale of parens patriae, which was
broadened to include the protection of both infants and needy citizens.18
Another theory for state intervention in the family has been found in
the state's police power.19 This is the foundation of state authority to pro-
vide for the general welfare of all of its citizens, particularly the
impoverished, the elderly and minors.'o Under this power the legislature
is enabled to create guidelines for the protection of these groups. Unlike
parens patriae, a power inherent in the King's status, the police powers
of a democratic state come from the people themselves. Regardless of
the rationale relied upon, the state legislatures of the latter nineteenth
century were pressured increasingly by social reformers and concerned
citizens to enact legislation providing for increased governmental involve-
ment in the affairs of children.21 These reformers desired intervention
in the family in order for the state to protect the "best interest" of the
child. "
" See Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L.
REV. 205 (1971).
Our society because of cultural enthnocentrism and an unwillingness to
admit that poor people were entitled to full citizenship, continued to
derogate children's right to liberty and parent's right to custody. By call-
ing the statutes "protective" and by borrowing the idea of parens patriae
the reformers were able to state their task elegantly and to dazzle many
observers ... there is more than a little irony in my use of the words
"protective" and parens patriae.
Id. at 205. See also Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance of Parens
Patriae, 22 S.C.L. REV. 147 (1970).
15 For a discussion of the origins of parens patriae and a critique of its misuse
in the termination area, see Rendleman, supra note 14.
16 Id. at 205.
17 Id. at 210-11.
18 Id. at 223-39.
'9 Id. at 257. For a critique of the way the state's police power was used,
see id. at 257-59.
1 The powers of the state to regulate these classes of people were expanded
gradually. These powers were used primarily to regulate the poor and their
children. Id. at 223-39.
21 Id. at 229-44.
Note, Neglected Children and Their Parents In Indiana, 7 IND. L. REV. 1048,
1054-56 (1974).
[Vol. 31:679
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While the precise origin of the best-interests standard for state interven-
tion is unclear, it seems to have had its beginnings in English common
law. An early example of its use can be found in Blissets case,' 3 where
Lord Mansfield, adjudicating a custody dispute, declared that if "the par-
ties [disagree] the court will do what shall appear best for the child.""
This standard provides for a great deal of court discretion. The standard's
strength is that it affords courts an opportunity to consider whatever they
deem appropriate when determining what a child needs for his protec-
,tion and care. At a time when social reformers were lobbying for legisla-
tion to protect children, the best-interests guideline for court action quickly
gained universal acceptance.25
The first Juvenile Court, founded in Cook County, Chicago in 1899,
represented a union of the theories for state intervention and the social
reformer's concerns that children needed special protection." In order
to provide adequately for, rather than punish, destitute children, the
philosophy of the court stressed the need for both broad discretionary
powers to properly adjudicate juvenile actions and the need for limited
procedural protections." Critics found reasons to attack the court and
its underlying rationale.
B. Modern Concerns
The parens patriae doctrine has been criticized by both scholars and
courts." The broad governmental powers arising from it have been used
discriminatorily against the poor, whom the doctrine was originally
designed to assist.' Legislation for children has been used to deprive
children of their liberty and parents of their custody rights.3 1 While the
98 Eng. Rep. 899 (Ch. 1774).
24 Id. at 899.
For an indication of the modern use of this standard see Katz, Howe &
McGrath, supra note 4, at 66-69. The best interest standard serves to direct the
court's attention to the child and away from the parent's right to custody and
control.
Rendleman, supra note 14, at 256-59.
The extent of procedural protection varied widely, however, given the broad
statutory language and the lack of resources available to the impoverished, the
litigation over this lack of protections was minimal. Id. at 245-47.
' Rendleman, supra note 14, at 257. "Acting under the police power to regulate
and camouflaging its action by chanting parens patriae, the state assumed the
power to dissolve ... the ties between impoverished parents and their children.
[.. It is wrong to say that there was any flexibility or balancing of interests
in making these decisions." Id. See also Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10
(S.D. Iowa 1975), affid, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
, Rendleman, supra note 14, at 257-59.
This results from the broad powers enjoyed by the state under parens
patriae. See Day, Termination of Parental Rights Statutes And The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine: A Successful Attack On The Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 J.
FAM. L. 213 (1978). The author discusses Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp.
10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) as a successful
1982]
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state has a duty to care for its dependent, neglected, abandoned and
abused children, those advocating the modern trend towards parental
autonomy argue that the parens patriae power is too often used in situa-
tions where state interference should be kept to a minimum."
Courts have rejected the underlying rationale for parens patriae
authority.' Although the state may need a degree of flexibility and discre-
tion when deciding how to best provide for a juvenile in a termination
proceeding, there are recognized limits to the exercise of this discretion.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides such a
restriction by mandating strong consideration of the fundamental right
of family integrity before a court may terminate parental rights.3 An
additional argument for limiting the state's intervention in family affairs
is based on the lack of evidence supporting beneficial results after state
interference." The modern approach to termination proceedings focuses
essentially on a balancing of the state's, parents' and child's interests. 5
This focus constricts the discretion allowed under the parens patriae doc-
trine and the state's police power. Scholars have criticized the use of these
powers because they do not provide a proper balancing of interests."
While the best-interests-of-the-child standard provides the proper focus
for a termination decision, it has also been arguably subject to arbitrary
use. This standard does not clearly indicate the weight the court should
apply to factors involved in a decision to terminate. 7 A court should not
conclude simply that the termination of parental rights is in the child's
best interest and then proceed to substitute that judgment for a reasoned
analysis of the interests involved.
challenge to the parens patriae rationale due to the vague termination statute
involved. The court in Alsager limited the breadth of the state's power by deter-
mining that a statute as broad as the one involved could lead to arbitrary decision-
making in termination proceedings. But see State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 251, 486
P.2d 567 (1971) (termination statute upheld against vagueness challenge becaue
of the need for broad parens patriae authority). For a critique of the best interest
standard and its potential for arbitrary usage see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &
A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
31 Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 989.
32 See Day, supra note 30.
1 Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), affid, 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
3' Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 999.
36 See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
See Family Integrity, supra note 3. "Vague statutory standards for removal
and low standards of evidentiary proof combine to maximize judicial discretion
and minimize substantive protection." Id. at 228. See also In re La Rue, 244 Pa.
Super. 218, 336 A.2d 1271 (1976) (best interest standard does not provide suffi-
cient guideline to prevent arbitrary decisions).
" The standard is interpreted broadly in order to maximize judicial discre-
tion. It is this discretion which causes the most concern among scholars. For a
discussion of the need for specificity in determining children's needs see Realistic
Standards, supra note 3.
[Vol. 31:679
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Whether the decision to terminate is based on the use of parens patriae,
police power or the state's obligation to the child's best interests, the
critique of these rationales is the same. While their intent is well-meaning,
in practice they provide so much discretion that the interest of the parent
may be regarded too lightly. The modern focus on interest balancing and
the call for more specificity in termination statutes are direct results of
the recognized potential for arbitrary terminations under the broad state
authority of the past.
What has remained from the past is legitimate concern for what will
benefit the child. What has changed is the strength of the presumption
that the child's best interest is served by remaining with his parents.
As a fundamental right of family integrity has been acknowledged, the
strength of this presumption has increased. The interest-balancing
approach continues to acknowledge a state's obligation to care for children
but also provides for a reasoned analysis of the parents' interests.
In Santosky v. Kranwr,l the Supreme Court was concerned about the
entire process of termination of parental rights. No one doubts the need
for state action in certain situations but, because there are fundamental
rights at stake, the Court could not allow the termination scheme in
Santosky to stand unchecked through the use of a low standard of proof.
A low standard of proof in these proceedings would only exacerbate the
potential for a misuse of state power.39 Other factors causing concern to
the Court included: the state agency's ability to shape the "historical
events that form the basis for termination";0 vast differences in "litiga-
tion resources" between parents and the state; no possible double jeopardy
defense available to parents if a termination attempt fails; and parental
inability to "forestall future termination" attempts, by the state, if the
parents do improve their situation after an initial termination attempt.41
A primary thrust of the Santosky Court's concerns was the lack of paren-
tal resources to fend off a permanent attempt by the state. This is not
11 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
'9 Id. at 765-70.
40 Id. at 763, 763 n.13.
' Id. at 762-64. The respondent State of New York had argued that the
standard of proof should not be isolated for the Court's review. They wanted
their termination procedures perceived as a "package." Id. at 757 n.9. The Court
majority refused to do so because of the number of factors which give the state
an advantage in the decisionmaking process, and because: "Retrospective case-
by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings
is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard." Id. at 757.
" Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2, at 532 (footnotes omitted). The termina-
tion proceeding has, as a primary goal, the purpose of ensuring a psychological
parent for the child. This ensures continuity in the upbringing of the child and
the existence of a stable relationship through which the child is properly socialized.
For a discussion of the recommendation that termination orders should be
intereocutory and should be rescinded if a stable environment is not found for
the child see id. at 550-55.
19821
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to imply that the Court was not concerned with the rights of the state
or of the child. The rights of the parties to a termination proceeding have
been the subject of many court opinions and scholarly works. The next
Section of this Note analyzes the rights of parents, child and state. The
proper balancing of these interests creates a major challenge in a ter-
mination decision.
III. THE RIGHTS OF THE INVOLVED PARTIES
A. Parental Rights
No one seems to be able to agree on a suitable legal explana-
tion of a biological parent's rights in his child. In the nineteenth
century, these rights were likened to property rights, with the
child having the status of chattel. Such an analysis seems to have
been discarded in this century. The right has also been likened
to a trust relationship, conferred by natural law on the biological
parent but revocable by the state in certain circumstances. More
recently, a parent's relationship to his child has been conceived
of as a compact, with the parent's rights balanced against certain
obligations owed to the child."2
The conceptualization of the parent-child relationship has changed
dramatically since the early belief that the child was property. The clearest
evidence of this change has been the increased recognition of the child's
rights vis-a-vis the parents.2 However, despite increased recognition of
the child's legal interests, the rights of parents remain strong. Their rights
coexist with responsibilities owed to the child." Parental rights include:
control over living standards, custody of children, control of education,
control over inheritance, control over children's behavior and others."
The Supreme Court has looked increasingly at the family institution
to determine other parental rights and obligations.46 While these rights
are deemed important, they are not absolute."7 The state moves to take
custody away from the parents when parental obligations have not been
properly met." This is particularly true when parents violate their right
to custody and control by failing in their obligation to provide a safe liv-
, The growing trend in recognition of children's rights is discussed at length
in, A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE (1977).
4 The Supreme Court has increasingly looked at the nature of these rights
and responsibilities. See Burt, supra note 1.
" Id. at 329.
46 See Burt, supra note 1.
" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See also Note, Family Law-
Standard of Proof-"Clear and Convincing Evidence" Standard of Proof Will be
Required in All Proceedings for Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 559, 560 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Family Lawl.
46 Family Law, supra note 47, at 561.
[Vol. 31:679
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss4/6
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
ing environment for the child.'9 Such a parental failure results in the state
taking custody. For example, in In re D.L.H.,' the Supreme Court of
Nebraska upheld the termination of parental rights where the mother
exhibited long-standing alcohol and mental illness problems51 which were
unlikely to subside. The mother's illness made it impossible for her to
fulfill her parental responsibilities.52 While the court held the mother's
right to custody to be a natural one, it is "not an inalienable right and
the public has a paramount interest in the protection of the rights of a
child."'
In termination proceedings the state must penetrate parental rights
and the fundamental right of family integrity which is protected by the
due process'M and equal protection15 clauses of the fourteenth and ninth
amendments.' The Supreme Court has determined that these rights
deserve strong protection.5 7 Despite this need for strong protections, the
Court has not guaranteed the right to counsel for parents in civil pro-
ceedings where child neglect is the primary issue.5 A determination that
'9 Burt, supra note 1, at 338.
o 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977). In D.L.H. the mother was appealing
an order for permanent termination of her parental rights. The court upheld the
order due to her habitual use of intoxicating substances and long history of men-
tal illness.
5, Id. at 446, 253 N.W.2d at 285.
52 Id. at 451, 253 N.W.2d at 287.
Id. at 447-48, 253 N.W.2d at 285 (citing State v. Tibbs, 197 Neb. 236, 248
N.W.2d 230 (1976)). 1
See, e.g., Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition of the teaching
of foreign languages violated due process liberty rights of parents and children).
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary compulsory
sterlilization violated equal protection).
I See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (fourteenth and ninth
amendments imply a fundamental right of privacy in married couples vis-a-vis
child-bearing decisions).
51 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 425 U.S. 18 (1981), the Supreme
Court determined that appointed counsel was not required for every indigent
parent involved in a termination proceeding. It was noted, however, that the fact
that process is due a parent, in a termination proceeding, was not disputed by
the parties. The parents' rights do deserve strong protections. In Santosky, the
court stated:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of
their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained,
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruc-
tion of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolu-
tion of their parental rights have a more critical need for protection than
do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.
455 U.S. at 753.
Some situations involve such important potential consequences that the
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a child is neglected can lead to a petition for permanent custody and the
subsequent termination of parental rights; 9 yet these initial proceedings
lack basic safeguards which could be determinative in later, more critical
proceedings.
Parental rights are strongly and deeply rooted in American tradition."
Because of this belief, courts presume that the best place for the child
is with his parents. 1 However, this presumption is rebuttable. Every state
has enacted legislation which, in effect, describes when this presumption
may be overcome.' These statutes describe the circumstances which must
exist before the state may remove the child from the family. 3 These cir-
cumstances are categorized in terms such as "neglect," "dependency,"
"abuse" or "abandonment."" Some evidence points to parental control of
the child as the determinative issue in a termination decision. Under this
theory, courts will more frequently allow state intervention in the family
when they perceive that the parental right of control is being exercised
improperly.6 5 Courts that order a termination of parental rights generally
focus on the conduct of parents and the best interests of the child. Some
scholars have called for courts to focus on the specific harms the child
may suffer if he remains in the home66 rather than on parental behavior.
This emphasis on "harms," it is argued, would ensure more strongly that
parental rights are not arbitrarily terminated and would allow the courts
Supreme Court has determined that the right to counsel must exist. This right
exists in proceedings to determine delinquency. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
The fact that liberty interests are at stake in other juvenile proceedings has not
resulted in a determination of the existence of the right to counsel. For a discus-
sion of the lack of procedural and other safeguards in juvenile actions where delin-
quency and other adjudications are at issue, see Note, Juvenile Delinquent and
Unruly Proceedings in Ohio: Unconstitutional Adjudications, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
602 (1975).
" See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 13-14 (S.D. Iowa, 1975).
Family Law, supra note 47, at 561.
61 Id. at 562.
62 For a survey of the child neglect statutes in all 50 states see Katz, Howe
& McGrath, supra note 4. The termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy.
It is ordered only after a close examination of all relevant facts and circumstances.
Basky, supra note 8, at 4.
See Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4.
6Id.
5 Burt, supra note 1.
But when parents in fact fail to control their child, then their authority
no longer commands respect in principle. Parents whose effective
authority has failed can rehabilitate themselves and their claim to con-
stitutionally mandated respect only by invoking some extrafamilial
authority to buttress their weakened force-a psychiatrist who will in-
stitutionalize their child, a teacher who will paddle their child, a judge
who will rule their child.
Id. at 388.
See, e.g., Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 1004-36.
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to focus on the child's right to live in a safe environment." Presently,
judicial consideration of termination of parental rights involves a balanc-
ing of the interests of parent, child and the state.
B. The Rights of the Child
In the past 100 years, children's rights have undergone a dramatic
change. 8 For example, in the child custody area the trend is toward giv-
ing children a voice in deciding with whom they will live. 9 For purposes
of termination analysis, the child's rights must be examined vis-a-vis the
parents' rights. In termination proceedings, these rights are balanced.
With the rise of the juvenile court movement, the focus on the child's
best interests has become paramount." The child has a right to live in
an environment which provides a consistent, loving relationship7 1 in order
to develop as a productive adult." The court's focus on the child's needs
ensures that the child can have such an environment even if he must
be removed from his home to a foster placement or adoptive setting. The
best-interests guideline provides a broad discretion to a court making such
a decision. Arguably, this discretion is needed to protect the child's rights.73
However, the best-interests standard has been criticized as creating too
great a potential for arbitrary termination decisions.' Those advocating
a constriction of the discretion allowed under this standard have advanced
essentially two approaches to the problem: (1) the creation of stricter
standards of proof for termination decisions;" and (2) enacting less vague
termination statutes which focus on the serious injuries a child may suffer
Id. at 990-95.
If the focus of termination statutes was on harms to the child as opposed
to parental conduct we would still be addressing the child's needs. To
approach the problem from the standpoint of parental behavior has the
effect of closely regulating child rearing patterns, when diversity in these
patterns should be protected.
Id. at 993. For a discussion of the child's need for a continuous loving relation-
ship, see Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2.
" See A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE (1977).
69 Id. at 157.
71 See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
71 Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2, at 537.
71 Id. at 536-40.
71 For a discussion of the need for broad discretionary powers and low
standards of proof in termination proceedings see Note, Dependency and Termina-
tion Proceedings in California - Standards of Proof, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1815 (1979).
See also Note, Dependency Proceedings: What Standard of Proof? An Argument
Against The Standard of "Clear and Convincing," 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155
(1977).
7, It has been suggested that a best-interest standard improperly allows a
judge or a social worker to make judgments based on personal feelings and values.
In re La Rue, 244 Pa. Super. 218, 220-24, 366 A.2d 1271, 1274-76 (1976).
76 See Clear and Convincing, supra note 3.
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in an inappropriate family environment rather than on parental conduct."
Neither of these alternatives specifically rejects the idea that the child's
best interests should be considered. However, both would limit the discre-
tionary powers of the court when granting an order for permanent ter-
mination. The concern for limiting the discretion in the current termina-
tion system does not indicate that the child's rights are becoming less
important. Rather, these alternatives stress the modern concerns with
safeguarding the right of the child to remain with his parents," and with
providing more procedural protections for the juvenile law system as a
whole. 8
The modern termination proceeding is viewed as a balancing of the
rights and interests involved. 9 This balancing places different emphasis
on the rights of the parent and child in different jurisdictions.' One fac-
tor which plays a role in determining how much weight is given to the
rights of parent or child is the standard of proof required for termina-
tion. All things being equal, when the standard of proof is high it is
generally believed that the court is weighing the parents' interest more
heavily than the child's." Because this is a balancing of interests, the con-
verse is also true.
The criticisms of the modern termination system have included con-
cern over the vagueness of termination statutes and the low standards
of proof. Given these features of the termination proceeding, even a pro-
per balancing of interests, alone, may not reduce the potential for
erroneous decisions.2 This is disconcerting to those focusing on the fun-
damental right of family integrity.Y Regardless of which argument is used,
however, the state can never ignore its legitimate interest in protecting
its children.
C. The State's Interest
The state must be concerned with the welfare of its citizens, including
children who, because of their very status, are vulnerable" and who
7 See Realistic Standards, supra note 3.
" The assumption that the best place for the child is with his parents has
always been fairly strong. A recent congressional expression of this assumption
is found in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. PUB. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat.
3069, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1901-63 (Supp. III 1979).
78 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78 Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 797-99.
8 The balancing of interests accords different weights to such elements as
parental right to custody and child's right to live in a safe environment. Id.
81 Id.
" There are other features of the termination system which should be included
in the balancing to arrive at the proper standard of proof. See generally Realistic
Standards, supra note 3. See also Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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deserve special attention from the state. As a result, all states provide
protective services to children85 and require the mandatory reporting of
child abuse." When less intrusive methods fail or when the child is in
need of a safer environment, the state may attempt to remove the child
from the parents. If temporary custody is taken, the state will place the
child in a foster care situation or in an institution. During this time, the
responsible state agency will evaluate the family for improvements in
its home situation. When improvement is observed, the child may be
returned.87
The most drastic remedy sought by the state is permanent custody
which allows the state to seek an adoptive setting for the child." In order
to take permanent custody, the state must petition the court for perma-
nent termination of parental rights. All states have statutes relating to
termination. 9
While the state interest is certainly legitimate, the ease with which
the state can intervene in the family has been suspect.' Much has been
said regarding the authority of the state to effectuate its interests in
children." Some legal writers have advocated a constriction of this
authority.2 It is generally perceived that the state's intrusion into the
family, where the standard of proof required to terminate parental rights
is high, is more limited than when the standard is low. 3 In a termination
proceeding, the state must prove, under a certain statutory or judicially
adopted standard of proof, that the petition for termination should be
granted. The higher the standard of proof, the more difficult it is for the
state to prove its case. Hence, the likelihood increases that the state's
petition for termination will not be granted. In other words, a higher
standard of proof should result in fewer terminations of the parent-child
relationship. Thus, the standard of proof which the state must meet in
I See Note, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J.
FAM. L. 115 (1979). These services focus on the treatment of the situations from
which maltreatment of the child results. The aim of the services is to change
the family environment. Id. at 137.
Id. at 124. See also, Note, Protecting Child From Parents Who Provide
Insufficient Care-Temporary and Permanent Statutory Limits on Parental Custody,
1980 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953.
1 For an overview of issues relating to temporary custody, see Realistic Stan-
dards, supra note 3.
Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2, at 543.
89 Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4 (for an overview of statutes of this
type).
" See, e.g., Clear and Convincing, supra note 3; Realistic Standards, supra
note 3; State Intervention, supra note 8.
", See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
" See Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 987.
The state's ability to intervene in the family is limited by the procedural
protections afforded the parents. The standard of proof is one of these protec-
tions. See Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 798-99. See also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982).
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a termination action directly affects the rights and interests of all involved
parties.
Prior to Santosky v. Kramer," three standards of proof were permit-
ted in termination proceedings: a preponderance of the evidence,95 clear
and convincing evidence" and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." The
Santosky decision provides that at least clear and convincing evidence must
be used in a termination proceeding." This Note will examine the
application of all three standards in order to provide at least some
examples of judicial use of these standards. Although the preponderance
standard is no longer constitutionally permissible, some examples of its
use have been incorporated into the analysis in order to demonstrate the
inherent problems with the use of this standard. Furthermore, the
examples of the use of the preponderance standard underscore the need
for procedural protections in termination proceedings and assist in
understanding Santosky v. Kramer.
IV. STANDARD OF PROOF
The state must prove certain facts or circumstances before it can ter-
minate parental rights.99 These vary from state to state, 0 as does the
standard of proof necessary to carry its burden.'0 ' A distinction must be
drawn between what the state must show and how strongly it must be
shown. In a discussion of the standard of proof the focus is on the strength
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
In civil cases the extreme caution and the unusual positiveness of per-
suasion required in criminal cases do not obtain. It is customary in this
field to attempt to define the quality of persuasion necessary by an ex-
pression which unfortunately has-no logical or conceptual correlation
with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" of criminal cases; the phrase is
that there must be a "preponderance of evidence" in favor of the defend-
dant's proposition.
J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW, S 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). While the court required the
use of clear and convincing evidence, it cautioned that the manner in which these
various standards affect the decision-making process may be "unknowable." Id.
at 424-25.
07 J. WIGMORE, supra note 95, at S 2497. The early formulations of this
standard included such descriptions as "a clear impression" and "upon clear
grounds." Id.
455 U.S. at 769-70. For a listing of the standards used in various jurisdic-
tions prior to Santosky, see id. at 749 n.3.
The language of termination statutes is not uniform. These statutes address
terms such as dependency, neglect, abandonment, etc. For a review of this
language, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4.
100 Id.
Id. at 32-33. While the preponderance standard is no longer a permissible
one, this source is valuable for its presentation of the various phraseology used
to describe a standard of proof.
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of the state's case not on what the state is attempting to prove. The
standard of proof represents an allocation of the risk of an erroneous deci-
sion to a given party."' For example, in a civil action the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard is used because the risk of an erroneous deci-
sion is balanced evenly between the parties; it would be just as damag-
ing to decide wrongly for the plaintiff as it would be to decide wrongly
for the defendant. Moreover, the highest standard is used where the
greatest potential for erroneous decision lies.
The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is traditionally used in civil
proceedings where the interests at stake may only be monetary."3 Where
the consequences of the civil action may be more drastic, as in a pro-
ceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, the standard
required may be higher'"2 and may also involve constitutional issues. When
a fundamental right is at stake, the preponderance standard does not
afford adequate protection. 5
The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is considered an inter-
mediate approach to balancing the interests involved in a civil action.'"
In Tucker v. Marion County Department of Public Welfare, °7 the court
held that a permanent termination order was supported by a
preponderance of the evidence."0 8 The mother and grandmother of the
children had appealed the order and argued that the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard was the appropriate standard for termination pro-
ceedings."0 The court found that the use of that standard would provide
too great a protection to parental rights and not enough protection to
the child who could be returned to "a hostile, if not dangerous, family
and home environment""' by a mistaken termination decision. Despite
the Tucker court's concern over the use of the clear-and-convincing-
evidence standard, a number of states have determined that this stand-
102 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (clear and convincing evidence needed
for involuntary commitment to a state hospital). Where society's interest in the
outcome of a judicial proceeding is not great, a lesser standard is appropriate.
The Addington court balanced the interests of the state and the individual to
determine the appropriate standard. Id. at 425.
103 441 U.S. at 423.
104 Id. at 424.
105 See Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 799 (family is not protected ade-
quately through the use of preponderance standard in a termination proceeding).
108 441 U.S. at 424. This standard of proof is probably the least understood.
Id. at 425. It is used in some civil actions where the interests at stake are greater
than monetary and involve a fundamental right. Clear and Convincing, supra note
3, at 794-95.
107 408 N.E.2d 814 (Ind. App. 1980).
108 Id. at 819.
109 Id.
"I Id. at 820 (relying on Hernandez v. State ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Economic
Sec., 23 Ariz. App. 32, 530 P.2d 389 (1975)).
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ard properly balances the interests in termination proceedings."' For ex-
ample, New Hampshire utilizes the clear-and-convincing standard when
the state petitions for temporary custody,"' a less drastic remedy than
permanent custody.
The most stringent standard of proof is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. This is the standard used in criminal proceedings"' due to the
irretrievable loss of one's liberty resulting from an incorrect decision.
While all three standards of proof are used in proceedings to terminate
parental rights permanently, the reasonable-doubt standard is used less
frequently than the other two. Notably, it is the standard required under
the Indian Child Welfare Act... and in the states of New Hampshire"5
and Louisiana."'
Termination decisions present difficult and serious questions for the
court. For example, in In re Cynthia K." the California Appellate Court
described involuntary termination "as a drastic remedy which should be
resorted to only in extreme cases of neglect or abandonment.""' 8 To deter-
mine the appropriate standard, a court must weigh not only the interests
of the parties but also the practical aspects of proving the contentions
of the state."9 While a court must consider the existence of a constitu-
"I See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749 n.3 (for a listing of states using clear and
convincing evidence in termination proceedings).
11 For a breakdown of state statutes governing temporary and permanent
custody proceedings see Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 4.
.j  WIGMORE, supra note 95, at S 2497.
"' 25 U.S.C. S 1912(f) (Supp. III 1979).
"1 In re Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
1" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13:1603.A (West Supp. 1982).
117 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1977). The Cynthia K. court upheld
an order for permanent termination of parental rights based on clear and convin-
cing evidence. Because the issue of which standard should apply was not raised
below, the appellate court would not hear the issue on appeal.
118 Id. at 84, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
"1 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). One of the concerns of the
Addington court when deciding the proper standard of proof in civil commitment
proceedings was the type of evidence used in these proceedings-psychological
information, etc. The court stated that one of the mechanisms to ensure that
an erroneous decision would be corrected would be the interest of concerned family
members. Id. This reasoning could not be used in a permanent termination situa-
tion since family members lose the right to communicate with the child. Thus,
the after-the-fact protection noted in Addington does not exist after a permanent
termination proceeding.
In Santosky, the Court's analysis of the appropriate procedures to be followed
in a termination proceeding revolved around three factors described in Matthews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). These factors are: the private interests that are
affected by the proceeding; the risk of an erroneous decision given the procedures
used; and the government's interest, including the fiscal strain placed on the
government by adopting new procedures. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 332-35. The San-
tosky Court based its determination of the appropriate standard of proof on the
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tionally protected right to family integrity, it must also be aware of the
adverse effects on the child if it denies a necessary termination. 1"0 The
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is preferable for termination pro-
ceedings, and it will be demonstrated in the following Section that this
standard protects both the child's interests and the right of family
integrity.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF THE BEYOND-A-REASONABLE-DOUBT STANDARD
A. Historical Overview
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard appears to have emerged dur-
ing the latter part of the 1700's.' Originally, its definition resembled that
used for clear and convincing evidence,'2 but later descriptions such as
"moral certainty"'" gave the standard a separate identity. Unlike the clear-
and-convincing and preponderance-of-the-evidence standards, which focus
on the quality of the evidence itself, the reasonable-doubt standard is
characterized by the state of mind." There is no reason to believe that
a clear description of this standard can be formulated since it has evaded
clarification from the time of its inception. 25
In In re Welfare of Rosenbloom," the court specifically rejected the argu-
ment for the use of the reasonable-doubt standard in termination pro-
ceedings and held that clear and convincing evidence was appropriate.
In its discussion of the reasonable-doubt standard, the court- indicated
that this standard is appropriate primarily for criminal actions because
the potential loss of liberty and the stigma of conviction are such grave
consequences." 7 The Rosenbloom court did state, however, that the
reasonable-doubt standard is desirable for certain civil actions which could
result in a loss of liberty.'28 In reaching its holding, the court did not
address the fundamental right of family integrity nor did it speak to the
Matthews criteria: a broad base which encompasses the constitutionally protected
interests of the parties as well as the practical problems in administering any
set of procedures.
" For a discussion of the need to focus on the specific harms a child may
suffer if termination is not granted, see Realistic Standards, supra note 3.
121 J. WIGMORE, supra note 95, at § 2497.
12 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
128 266 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978). In Rosenbloom the court rejected the use of
the reasonable doubt standard in permanent termination proceedings. The mother
who appealed the termination order had argued that due process required the
use of the highest standard. The court held that clear and convincing evidence
was appropriate. Id. at 889-90.
" Id. at 889.
1N Id.
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fact that the termination of parental rights may be more offensive to
parents than a criminal sanction. '1 These factors should play a part in
the balancing of the interests when determining the appropriate stan-
dard of proof in a termination proceeding.
It has been stated that the reasonable-doubt standard should not be
used in termination proceedings"n because: (1) the evidence is, by nature,
subject to wide interpretation; (2) it would not protect the child's
interests; 1 and (3) it would place too heavy a burden on the state.13 2 While
these reasons appear valid, they alone do not substantiate the failure of
the courts to accept this standard."' A compelling case can be made for
the use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
B. An Argument for the Use of the
Beyond-A-Reasonable-Doubt Standard of Proof
In In re Robert H.,11 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire adopted
12 See, e.g., In re Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978). In addition
to the impact on the parents, a permanent termination may be injurious to the
child even if the parents could be labelled as "bad." State Intervention, supra
note 8, at 639-40.
130 See Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 787-88. Most courts and
legislatures have chosen not to use the reasonable doubt standard. Id.
131 Id. at 789.
"I Id. at 801.
13 The Santosky Court briefly discussed the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
and concluded that it placed too heavy a burden on the state to require the use
of this standard. 455 U.S. at 768-69. The Court's determination was based on con-
sideration of the types of evidence used in termination proceedings. Evidence
such as medical and psychiatric reports, and issues such as parental unfitness
come together in a termination proceeding. The Santosky Court determined that
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was not appropriate for these issues.
Id. at 769. However, the court also stated cogently that the state has the power
to shape the "historical events that form the basis for termination." Id. at 763.
"Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency's own
professional caseworkers whom the state has empowered both to investigate the
family situation and to testify against the parents." Id. The impact of this testimony
cannot be underestimated. Despite the concededly difficult-to-prove issues in a
termination proceeding, courts have been able to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that a termination order should be granted.
The courts of several jurisdictions have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
a termination order should be granted despite the fact that this standard was
not statutorily required. See, e.g., Robinson v. People ex rel. Zollinger, 173 Colo.
113, 476 P.2d (1970) (trial court found evidence in favor of termination supported
beyond a reasonable doubt); Coffey v. Department of Social Servs., 41 Md. App.
340, 397 A.2d 233 (1979) (chancellor found beyond a reasonable doubt that ter-
mination was in child's best interest and that parental visitation should be discon-
tinued); In re D.L.H., 198 Neb. 444, 253 N.W.2d 283 (1977) (beyond a reasonable
doubt that child's best interest was protected by termination); In re J.Z., 190
N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971) (trial court found beyond reasonable doubt that J.Z. had
suffered serious physical injury due to maltreatment by father).
u 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
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the use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in proceedings
to terminate parental rights. The state had petitioned for custody of
Robert H.'s three children after he had failed to correct the situations
which were causing problems in the family environment and which had
led to the initial state action for temporary custody due to neglect.' 5 The
court refused to allow the termination to stand.'36 Robert H. apparently
had spoken on only one occasion with his welfare caseworker since the
Division of Welfare had designed a plan to help the family and prevent
the termination.'37 This caseworker had not contacted the family's prior
caseworker. When the termination petition was filed, the caseworker was
unaware of the health problems of Robert H. which contributed to his
inability to maintain employment and to his family's problems.' These
flaws in the services provided to the parents contributed to the court's
concern for protecting Robert H.'s family.
Focusing on the right of the parents to custody and care of their
children, the court cited the New Hampshire Constitution 9 as authority
for the existence of these natural family rights. In addition, the court
cited United States Supreme Court decisions establishing the fundamen-
tal right of family integrity and the protection afforded the family under
the due process clause.' 0 The court's concern for the manner in which
services were provided to the family, coupled with the fundamental rights
involved, prompted the court to hold that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard was the appropriate standard of proof for these proceedings.'"
The Division of Welfare was instructed by the court to continue working
with the family and that any further action to terminate would have to
conform to this highest standard."'
The Robert H. court was especially concerned about the drastic effect
of the termination decision. It compared the gravity of the termination
of parental rights with proceedings for involuntary commitment to
a psychiatric facility and stated that the permanent termination "can be
viewed as a sanction more severe than imprisonment."" Termination was
also described as a disposition more final "than voluntary commitment
or delinquency proceedings."'" Another concern voiced by the court in-
" Id. at 714, 393 A.2d at 1388.
136 Id. at 720, 393 A.2d at 1391.
"8 Id. at 718, 393 A.2d at 1390.
"8 Id. at 718, 393 A.2d at 1390.
"39 "The New Hampshire Constitution, part I, article 2 states that '[al men
have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights -among which are, the enjoying
and defending life and liberty .. .and .. .seeking and obtaining happiness.'"
Id. at 715, 393 A.2d at 1388.
"' Id. at 715-16, 393 A.2d at 1388-89.
. Id. at 720, 393 A.2d at 1391.
. Id. at 720, 393 A.2d at 1391.
Id. at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389.
Id. at 716. 393 A.2d at 1389.
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volved the class differential between caseworkers and their clients and
the effect that this social inequality could have on decisions to terminate. 45
This same issue played a role in the passage of the Indian Child Welfare
Act."1
6
Other concerns that prompted Congress to pass the Act included: the
break-up of Indian tribes and families by welfare agencies;'47 the lack
of understanding of Indian child-rearing patterns on the part of officials
responsible for assisting Indian families;"18 the frequency of permanent
termination proceedings involving Indian parents; 49 and the need to
empower tribal communities with jurisdiction to resolve custody con-
troversies within their community.' Indian parents suffered an inordi-
nately large number of unnecessary terminations because courts believed
that the children's best interests would be served by such action. However,
many of the children taken from their Indian parents were raised in non-
Indian families 5' and suffered psychological trauma later in life"2 as a
result of being reared in a culturally foreign environment.
Certainly the same issues that Congress hoped to address by this Act
can be found in society at large. Since the United States is comprised
of various ethnic groups and economic levels, a variety of child-rearing
patterns and lifestyles is present, some of which are destined to be
viewed as too different to be acceptable. When an individual with authority
to recommend termination confronts a pattern of child-rearing drastically
different from his own background, he will be more likely to classify it
as unacceptable. Some parents may lose the rights to custody and con-
trol of their children merely because they approach child-rearing
differently. A lack of acceptance or understanding of a variety of child-
rearing techniques on the part of welfare department employees can have
disastrous results for the family."s Furthermore, this lack of understand-
", Id. at 713, 393 A.2d at 1390.
", 25 U.S.C. SS 1901-63 (Supp. III 1979). For a discussion of the Act and a criti-
que of the rationale for its enactment, see Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS L. REV. 1287 (1980). The Act "is the
result of an attempt by Congress to promote the stability of Indian families and
tribes." Id. at 1287.
', Barsh, supra note 146, at 1287-92.
Id. at 1294-96.
" See id. at 1289 (for a chart contrasting Indian foster care, placements and
adoptions with those for non-Indian children).
"o Under the Act, tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction for children on the reser-
vation. In situations where this jurisdiction is lost, the tribe may petition the
government for return of jurisdiction. If the parents or tribe requests, a child
custody proceeding may be transferred to a tribal court from a state court. See
25 U.S.C. S 1918 (Supp. III 1979).
"' Barsh, supra note 146, at 1290.
152 Id. at 1290-92.
" See generally Barsh, supra note 146. See also In re Robert H., 118 N.H. 713,
393 A.2d 1287 (1978).
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ing creates bias which, when combined with the wide discretion of the
courts in termination proceedings, can result in too many terminations
under the guise of standards such as the "best interests of the child."'
5'
Indeed, Congress discovered that the procedures and federal programs
created to assist Indian families had caused the real problem.
15
Although the Act has been criticized for being vague and easy to
circumvent," its purpose is clearly defensible. The problems facing the
American Indian family could only be exacerbated by frequent termina-
tions of parental rights. Courts interpreting the Act have focused on its
purpose and procedural safeguards. In two cases recently decided by state
courts, the court majority found the Act to be determinative, and in
a third case a dissenting Chief Justice voiced strong disapproval of his
colleagues' failure to apply the Act's standard.
The first of these cases, In re Welfare of Chosa,157 was heard by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1980. The court vacated a termination
order and remanded the case for further proceedings subject to the Act.
It ruled that parental rights could not be terminated without a showing
that serious physical or emotional injury to the child would occur if he
remained in the home. In this case, the child's mother refused to cooperate
with the welfare agency and she was chemically dependent.'5 8 The court
stated that any further proceedings would "require that termination of
parental rights of Indian children .. . be supported by evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt.'
5 9
154 See In re La Rue 244 Pa. Super. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976). See also Barsh,
supra note 146, at 1297-98.
15 Barsh, supra note 146, at 1294-96. Those working in these programs often
lacked the training necessary to appreciate the differences in the child-rearing
practices of Indian culture. For example, the Indian methods of disciplining children
never rely on physical punishment. Also, the Indian parent does not supervise
his children closely. These practices have been used as evidence against Indian
parents in child neglect proceedings. Id. at 1295.
1 Id. at 1334-36.
,_7 290 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1980). The mother in Chosa was 15 years old at the
time of the birth of her son. After a period of time living with her sister she
began to show symptoms of chemical dependency. Her attempts to rehabilitate
herself were unsuccessful. Her son, Anthony, was taken from her on an order
for temporary custody. Eventually, an order for permanent termination was
granted. The Supreme Court of Minnesota vacated the order because of the Act.
Noting that Anthony's life had been fairly unstable since he was initially taken
from his mother, the court stated that:
This resolution of the case will not adversely affect Anthony's welfare
because further court proceedings could add little more to the disrup-
tion of Anthony's life than is presently occurring. However, we do ex-
press our desire that the proper authorities carefully monitor the situa-
tion and promptly seek termination of [the mother's] parental rights again
if she is unable to meet the challenge of parenthood.
Id. at 769.
" Id. at 767-79.
... Id. at 769.
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In the second case, E.A. v. State,"e the Supreme Court of Alaska decided
in 1981 not to apply the Act retroactively. Chief Justice Rabinowitz,
however, strongly dissented, advocating that the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard should apply regardless of the commencement date of the
original action. He opined that the purpose of the Act should not be
disregarded merely because of a procedural question' and that the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard should be used.
Last, in In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,'62 a case of first
impression for the Arizona Court of Appeals, the termination order was
reversed. The court noted that "[tlhe Act is based on the fundamental
assumption that it is in the Indian child's best interest that its relation-
ship to the tribe be protected.""'6 Custody in this case was returned to
the mother because the state had failed to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The court in Robert H. and the courts interpreting the Indian Child
Welfare Act were all addressing the child's needs and were all excep-
tionally hesitant to judicially alter the family structure. In Robert H. this
hesitancy was due to the New Hampshire Constitution. Courts inter-
preting the Act were obliged, by a statutory mandate, to assume that
the child's best interests would be served by his remaining at home. The
ultimate protection afforded these families is found in the standard of
proof required: beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Vague Termination Statutes and
Their Effect on Fundamental Rights
Apart from the statutory mandate of the Act and the constitutional
considerations relied upon in Robert H., there are other reasons for using
the highest standard of proof in proceedings to permanently terminate
parental rights. One compelling reason is the broad scope of termination
statutes.
The family is the foundation of society"4 and as such deserves special
protection from the intervention of the state. To this end, the right to
family integrity, a fundamental right, has been developed through a series
of Supreme Court decisions focusing on a wide range of issues relating
'm 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981). In E.A., the court upheld an order granting
permanent termination. The mother and grandparents had appealed the order
granted by the lower court. The order had been based on clear and convincing
evidence, the appropriate standard at the time of the order. Id. at 1212.
161 Id. at 1216.
1 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (1981).
' "The Act defines certain procedures to be followed in state court proceedings
involving Indian children. These procedures protect the Indian parent or custo-
dian from a moving party's abuse of either voluntary or involuntary placement
procedures." Id. at 204, 635 P.2d at 189.
I" See Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 771.
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to family law."6 5 Where a fundamental right exists, the Supreme Court
will use the strict-scrutiny test to determine whether a state statute
improperly infringes the exercise of the right.' This test requires the
state to have a compelling reason for interfering with the right and there
must be no less drastic alternatives available."6
Wide discretionary state powers to terminate parental rights have come
under increasing attack.'68 While the state's interest in assisting families
and children in need is laudable and would certainly be viewed by most
as a necessary and proper exercise of state authority and power, the ex-
pression of this interest in termination statutes has been criticized for
lack of specificity."6 9 Legal authorities critical of these statutes generally
find fault with the broad discretion which prevades the entire termina-
tion system due to a lack of procedural protections and a lack of statutory
focus on parental behavior rather than on the actual injury a child may
suffer if he remains at home.7 °
The protections afforded the family become even more significant in an
era when the right to family integrity is deemed "fundamental."'' One
approach to protecting this right would be the enactment of statutes which
are neither vague nor seriously lacking in due process considerations.
When determining whether a termination statute is vague, a court should
look at whether the statute gives the parents adequate notice of the
standards they must meet to retain custody of their children. The child's
best interests are not at issue in a vagueness challenge. 7 ' Even if the
child's interests were at issue, they would be better served by a more
specific and clearly written statute.'
615 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
" See generally Note, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes Ter-
minating Parental Rights, 1980 DUKE L.J. 336 [hereinafter cited as Vagueness
Doctrine].
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Realistic Standards, supra note 3; State Intervention, supra note
8; Barsh, supra. note 146.
169 See Day, supra note 30.
11' Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 1001.
The problems caused by statutory vagueness are intensified because
the statutes permit intervention solely on the basis of parental conduct
without requiring evidence of specific harms to children. ... Yet ...
all available evidence indicates that it is extremely difficult to correlate
parental behavior or home conditions with specific harms to the child.
... In light of the significant harm that can result from intervention,
it is essential that laws be drafted in a manner that assures that these
factors be taken into consideration ....
Id. at 1002-03.
'.. See generally Family Integrity, supra note 3. See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
' Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 166, at 359.
' Id. The state may be unable to prove its case the first time it attempts
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Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa' provides an example
of a court holding that a termination statute was vague. The federal
district court agreed with the family that the state must prove harm to
the children in excess of the harm to follow from termination in order
to establish its "compelling interest."'' 5 In Alsager, the initial decision to
remove all six children was made after a twenty minute visit to the home
by a county probation officer.17 At the time of the visit only Mrs. Alsager
and the youngest child were present.177 The county petitioned for, and
was granted, an order for temporary custody based on a finding of ne-
glect."' Subsequent to the neglect hearing, and less than one month later,
the petition was filed for permanent termination of parental rights.9 The
to have parental rights terminated. It may be unable to prove that the parents
are "unfit" according to the terms of a statute, even a broadly written statute.
But this is of little comfort to a family about to argue successfully against the
order for permanent termination.
Unlike criminal defendants, natural parents have no "double jeopardy"
defense against repeated state termination efforts. If the State initially
fails to win termination .... it always can try once again to cut off the
parents' rights after gathering more or better evidence. Yet even when
the parents have attained the level of fitness required by the State, they
have no similar means by which they can forestall future termination
efforts.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764. This problem is compounded by the fact that the state,
because of its resources, has the opportunity to "shape the historical events that
form the basis for termination." Id. at 763. Thus, a major problem with the ter-
mination system is the fact that the state, working within broadly worded statutes,
is afforded a continuing opportunity to reinterpret data and shape family history
in such a way that parents, possessing incomparable resources when contrasted
with those of the state, may be repeatedly subject to custody challenges.
.. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
176 Id. at 22-24.
176 "Based on her observations inside the house, and without seeing the other
five children, [the probation officer] determined that all six children should im-
mediately be removed to the Polk County Juvenile home. This removal was to
be temporary ... " Id. at 13.
177 Id.
178 Id. The hearing for temporary custody was held within one week of the
removal of the children. At the hearing the judge determined that the children
were, in fact, neglected and that they should remain in the custody of the court.
This is common procedure prior to the placement of children in an institution
or a foster care environment.
179 Id.
This petition alleged that the best interests of the children ... require
that the parent-child relationship ... be terminated by the Court because
said parents have substantially and continuously and repeatedly refused
to give their children necessary parental care and protection and because
said parents are unfit parents by reason of conduct detrimental to the
physical or mental health or morals of their children.
Id. at 13-14. The petition speaks in terms of parental conduct, not the specific
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statute allowing the termination was held to be vague both on its face
and as applied to the Alsager family. The court found that the Alsagers'
right to family integrity was "menaced by Iowa's parental termination
statute."' While the vagueness of termination statutes raises important
considerations when determining what protections should be afforded the
family faced with a termination action, it is not the only factor.
D. Other Considerations Affecting the
Fundamental Right of Family Integrity
1. The Problems with Temporary Custody
Before parental rights are terminated permanently, the state often seeks
to obtain temporary custody of the child. This allows the state to place
the child in an institution or with foster parents. In the latter case a situa-
tion may develop which creates an obstacle for parents attempting to
have their children returned. Foster parents have been accorded some
due process rights"'l with respect to children in their care. In addition,
in In re Diana P.," the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that foster
parents have standing to bring an action for permanent termination of
parental rights because they act in loco parentis for the child." In Diana
P. the child had been removed from the home after a neglect hearing
in 1974.8 Three years later the foster parents with whom she had been
placed learned that Diana was to be returned."5 They attempted to have
parental rights terminated in order to prevent Diana's removal. The court
held that they had a right to do so if "psychological family" ties had
developed between themselves and the child. " The standard of proof that
the foster parents had to meet was the same as if the state were peti-
harms that the child may suffer from remaining in this particular home environ-
ment. For a discussion of the need to focus termination statutes on the specific
harms a child will suffer if he remains at home, see Realistic Standards, supra
note 3.
180 406 F. Supp. at 16. The conclusion was stated to be "inescapable" that the
Alsagers had both a liberty and privacy interest in the integrity of their family
unit. Id.
181 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 416 (1977).
182 424 A.2d 178 (N.H. 1980) (Brock, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom P.V.B.,
452 U.S. 964 (1981).
18 424 A.2d at 180.
8 Id. at 179.
1 Id. at 180.
18 To conclude that foster parents can never stand in loco parentis to a
child in their care would be unrealistic. The foster parents, however,
should have had the foster child or children in their home long enough
to have formed a "psychological family." While a few weeks would not
be long enough, at least two or three years would seem sufficient ....
Id. at 181.
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tioning to have parental rights terminated.187 In such circumstances, the
need for the highest standard becomes even more apparent.
As foster parents are accorded standing to petition for permanent
custody, the court must weigh the interests of the foster parents against
the rights of the natural parents. In this balancing, the court must accord
more protection to the natural parents since their rights are inherently
fundamental. An appropriate safeguard would be the use of the highest
standard of proof. The decision in Diana P. may create a situation in which
parents will refuse to cooperate with the state in placing their children
in foster care because of the potential for the foster parents to gain per-
manent custody of their foster children.
In addition to the rights of foster parents, natural parents may face
other problems after temporary custody is granted. At least one state'"
presumes that it is best for the child to permanently terminate parental
rights when custody is not returned to the natural parents within two
years after it is granted to the state. Additionally, even if the natural
parent has taken affirmative action to correct any defect in parenting,
the court may refuse to vacate an order for permanent termination."
In Carter v. Kaufman,88 the California Court of Appeals held that the
187 "If there is to be a lesser standard in privately brought termination peti-
tions, which does not require the exhaustion of the [welfare] divisions resources
to assist the natural parents, then the constitutional safeguards announced in
Robert H. have become meaningless." Id. at 185. The Diana P. court was con-
cerned by the fact that the welfare division was contesting the termination action
brought by the foster parents of Diana. This could have been interpreted to mean
that the division did not feel it had served Diana's natural family to the fullest
extent possible; a guideline required by the court in Robert H. The court, however,
also stated that it had not intended to impose an impossible burden on the divi-
sion. As a result, the court did not allow the division's contest of the termination
action to prevent the foster parents from bringing the action. Id. at 182-83. Al-
though the Diana P. court determined that the foster parents would be required
to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to terminate the rights of her
natural parents, the extent to which this standard varies from the clear and con-
vincing standard is uncertain. See In re Dixon, 81 Ill. App. 3d 493, 502, 401 N.E.2d
591, 598 (1980) (appellate court referred to trial court which indicated that the
two standards are "substantially" similar).
18 See Coffey v. Department of Social Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 397 A.2d 233
(1979) which states:
Article 16 section 75 [Md. Code Ann.] ... provides: (a) After a child has
been under continuous foster care for a period of two consecutive years
under the custody of an agency authorized by law to make placements,
it shall be presumed by the court that it is in the best interest of the child
to award to that agency a decree granting guardianship with the right
to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, without the
consent of the natural parent or parents.
Id. at 350, 397 A.2d at 239-40.
189 See, e.g., In re Hiatt, 209 Neb. 195, 307 N.W.2d 108 (1981) (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting).
18 8 Cal. App. 2d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970).
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burden to prove that a child's dependency adjudication should be revers-
ed falls "clearly on the parent."1 91 Thus the initial action of the state for
temporary custody may create a number of difficulties for the natural
parent who attempts to have the children returned. These difficulties are
compounded by the fact that parents are not accorded the right to counsel
during these proceedings.'92 In addition, if the notice to appear in juvenile
court, which is sent to parents prior to a hearing, omits any reference
to the possible termination of parental rights, this lack of notice may not
be considered prejudicial'93 to the rights of parents. Thus, a state that
takes temporary custody may cause many problems for parents who are
concerned that permanent custody might eventually be granted. Other
problems, such as the judicial and procedural hurdles for the parents
created by the juvenile court system itself, must be considered when deter-
mining what standard of proof is necessary for the protection of family
integrity.
2. Juvenile Court and Evidentiary Concerns
The juvenile court judges hearing petitions for temporary and perma-
nent custody may lack understanding of sociological and psychological data
which would be of critical importance to a termination decision. 9' The
skills they apply in making these decisions are acquired in the courtroom"9 9
and usually are not the result of any special prior training in the analysis
of such data. If a juvenile court judge performs his duties well during
his tenue in juvenile court, he will likely be appointed to a higher court.
As a result of this process, a less-experienced judge will probably take
191 Id. at 785, 87 Cal. Rptr. 680.
192 Id. at 786, 87 Cal. Rptr. 679. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18 (1981) (5-4 decision) (fourteenth amendment due process does not re-
quire appointment of counsel for indigents in all termination proceedings).
193 Robinson v. People ex rel. Zollinger, 173 Colo. 113, 476 P.2d 262 (1970) (no
denial of due process if notice fails to indicate that termination is a possibility).
'9' State Intervention, supra note 8. "Few juvenile court judges are trained
in psychology or other behavioral sciences. Many are not even lawyers. Thirty
percent have not graduated from college. Only twenty percent spend full time
on juvenile matters; the rest rotate in and out of juvenile court." Id. at 640 (foot-
notes omitted). Thus, the juvenile courts may not have the resources to deal ap-
propriately with these problems.
' Because they receive no training in this area, juvenile judges learn from
the actual performance of their jobs. To assist judges and lawyers in interpreting
some of the complex information before them, articles have been written explaining
this kind of interpretation. See, e.g., Groves, Lawyers Psychologists and Psychologi-
cal Evidence in Child Protection Hearings, 5 QUEENS L.J. 241 (1980). The demands
of the job may be such that a judge will inevitably rely heavily on the agency
report. See, e.g., Note, Corey L. v. Martin L.: Involuntary Termination of Paren-
tal Rights Under New York's "Abandonment" Concept, 43 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Involuntary Termination].
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his place'9" and will need to develop the same competencies anew. Thus,
the expertise of the judge making these decisions varies greatly. Because
of "the permanent and irreversible nature of the order,"'97 a termination
decision must be made with great caution. However, given the problems
with judicial expertise, a situation exists which may cause too great a
potential for arbitrary termination of parental rights. The best-interests-
of-the-child standard simply does not provide enough guidance to a judge
making these decisions.'" This standard, however, is so strongly engrafted
to termination proceedings that a court's finding that continued custody
of a child by a welfare department is in the child's best interest can
actually be upheld on appeal regardless of the custody statute's require-
ment that another standard be used.'9 The best-interests standard does
not provide sufficient guidelines for the judges making termination
decisions.
In contrast, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would require a
stricter scrutiny of the evidence by judges. They would be forced to
evaluate the situation more comprehensively than they would by merely
focusing on the best interests of the child; the rights of the natural parents
would weigh more heavily in their considerations, and the result would
be a fairer adjudication for all the parties-the child, the parents and
the state.
In addition to the problems created by the application of a lower stan-
dard by an inexperienced judge, the evidence presented at termination
hearings can be equally problematic. Since the action is usually instituted
by a state agency, the reports submitted to the judge will be compiled
by social workers and probation officers. Judges rely heavily on these
reports. Even vague statements by the agency representatives, such as
termination being in the child's best interests, may be relied upon by
the court.8 0 Certainly the judge needs a wide variety of information to
make a proper decision, but to allow courts to consider as authoritative
such broad language by caseworkers gives the "social report" inap-
propriate importance in the termination decision. For example, in Robert
H."8' the caseworker recommending termination had not even spoken with
the family's prior caseworker. His testimony was merely hearsay.
These evidentiary problems are compounded because evidence of a
family's prior contact with the welfare agency or the court years earlier
'" For information regarding juvenile court judges, see Smith, A Profile of
Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE 27 (Aug. 1974).
' Basky, supra note 8 at 4.
1 In re La Rue, 244 Pa. Super. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976).
' In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979). The holding regarding
the standard of proof to be used in temporary custody proceedings has been
superseded by statute. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 169-C:13 (Equity Supp. 1981).
'o See Involuntary Termination, supra note 195.
N1 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
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may be used by the court to determine parental "design and general
intentions."' While this evidence should be admissible as proof of a history
of parental inability to provide a safe environment for their children, it
creates a difficult situation for parents. Once aware that this prior history
may be admissible in a termination hearing, parents may be unwilling
to seek help during the early stages of family problems.
Even a showing of parental fitness is insufficient to ensure that custody
rights will remain intact. In In re Cunningham,3 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that "[t]he mere fact that a natural parent is fit, though it is certainly
one factor that may enter into juvenile consideration, does not
automatically entitle the natural parent to custody . *.". ."' Thus, even
a fit parent may be unwilling to chance receiving assistance for any family
problems from the state because of the possibility that this may do nothing
more than help build a case against him at a later date.
The use of the highest standard of proof would attenuate the eviden-
tiary impact of prior contact with a welfare agency. Knowing that the
state had a higher evidentiary burden, parents would feel safer seeking
assistance from a welfare agency.
E. The State's Duty to Provide Services to Families
The extent to which the state must assist families prior to petitioning
for custody is another uncertain feature of the termination system. Some
courts have held that the state must diligently strive to provide services
to the family before attempting to intervene by terminating parental
rights. 5 Other courts have been unwilling to place such a burden on the
state before it can petition for permanent termination.
2 0
6
The Robert H. court held that the state must provide intensive ser-
vices to the family prior to attempting termination."7 This holding was
based upon two considerations: the importance of the family unit and the
obligation of the state to document strongly the need for termination.
If strong documentation of a dysfunctional family environment was a prere-
quisite to an action for termination, the state could only provide their
documentation through intensive work with the family."0 8
Certainly the state has an obligation to care for its dependent and
neglected children, but its obligation to provide services to families is
less clear. Although all states provide protective services to children and
202 See Robinson v. People ex rel. Zollinger, 173 Colo. 113, 476 P.2d 262 (1970).
59 Ohio St. 2d 100, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).
Id. at 106, 391 N.E.2d at 1038.
See, e.g., In re Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978).
See, e.g., Note, Duty of the State to Provide Supportive Services to a Parent
Before Terminating the Parent's Rights, 14 J. FAM. L. 341 (1975).
118 N.H. at 719, 393 A.2d at 1390-91.
Id. at 720, 393 A.2d at 1391.
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families,'" there is no universal standard for determining how intensely
the family must be served before a child can be taken from the home.
This lack of clear obligation to provide intensive services to families is
a distressing flaw in the termination system. The focus of state services
in the termination area should be the family, the site of the fundamental
right of family integrity.21 The welfare agency should have to document
both intensive work with the family and the failure of that work to change
the family environment before the state could move to take permanent
custody.
This recommendation is made with the caveat, however, that state agen-
cies understand and respect different child-rearing patterns. During the
hearings held prior to passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress
learned that the agencies assisting Indian families were partly responsi-
ble for unnecessary terminations of parental rights."' This was due to
their lack of understanding of the differences in child-rearing patterns.21
2
Such a lack of understanding would be decreased by more intensive in-
volvement with families.
The varied state policies regarding the extent to which a state agency
must provide services to the family unit prior to taking permanent custody
should be reexamined in light of the recognition of the fundamental right
of family integrity. A permanent termination should only be allowed after
the state has worked diligently to ensure that the family unit has a chance
to remain whole.2 1 1 If the standard of proof necessary for permanent ter-
mination was evidence convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, it would
help assure that the state would provide more services to families. Because
the state record would have to document the evidence necessary to meet
this standard, it would have to prove a genuine and prolonged effort to
assist the family.
F. Symbolic Value
One of the necessary considerations for determining the appropriate
standard of proof is its symbolic value."4 In part, the reasonable-doubt
Note, Child Maltreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J. FAM.
L. 115, 137 (1979).
210 See Family Integrity, supra note 3.
2 See Barsh, supra note 146, at 1292-94.
212 Id. at 1294-96.
212 The court in Robert H. was concerned that the division of welfare had not
worked thoroughly enough with the family. They encouraged the division to pro-
vide intensive staff time to families in need. 118 N.H. at 719, 393 A.2d at 1390-91.
214 Even more significant is the symbolic importance of the particular
standard of proof chosen. The function of the standard of proof is to
"instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a par-
ticular type of adjudication." The standard of proof serves to allocate
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standard is used for criminal proceedings because it conveys the impor-
tance of the interests at stake. For purposes of termination of parental
rights, the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the reasonable-
doubt standard are viewed by some courts as being "substantially
equivalent." ' 5 Given the call for placing restrictions on the courts' discre-
tion when deciding termination actions, one of the ways of doing so would
be the use of the reasonable-doubt standard. Even if some courts view
the standards as close, a legislative determination that the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard is to be used in termination proceedings would
resolve any uncertainty as to whether the appropriate standard was the
highest standard of proof. The use of this standard would symbolically
depict the strength of America's conviction that the family is the "cor-
nerstone of our democracy." ' This would also ensure that the agencies
responsible for providing services to families render them more
diligently"' and ensure that the focus of state activity is on the family
unit: the site of the fundamental right."8 The experience of New Hamp-
shire would suggest that the use of this standard would not frustrate
the state's duty to care for its children." 9 In other states, where the
reasonable-doubt standard is not required, courts have been able to make
findings using this standard in termination cases.220
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The balancing of parents', child's and state's interests is critical when
determining to terminate parental rights. Due to the fact that children
are so strongly tied to their parents, "even 'bad' parents, intervention
that disrupts the parent-child relationship can be extremely damaging
the risk of erroneous decision-making and to underscore the significance
of the ultimate determination to the factfinder.
Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 802 (footnotes omitted).
2"5 See In re Dixon, 81 Ill. App. 3d 493, 401 N.E.2d 591 (1980), where the court
stated:
The standard has been expressed that it should be by clear and con-
vincing evidence. I think probably this is the court standard. One court
has apparently interpreted that to mean beyond a reasonable doubt.
... I am not sure it is correct to say beyond a reasonable doubt. But
clear and convincing evidence would mean something substantially
equivalent to that.
Id. at 502, 401 N.E.2d at 598 (emphasis added).
216 Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 771.
2,, See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
218 Family Integrity, supra note 3.
219 Marshall, State v. Robert H.: A New Standard For Termination of Parental
Rights, 20 N.H.B.J. 205 (1979).
220 See, e.g., In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); Robinson v. People ex rel.
Zollinger, 173 Colo. 113, 476 P.2d 262 (1970); Coffey v. Department of Social Servs.,
41 Md. App. 340, 397 A.2d 233 (1979).
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to the child."'" Merely stating that termination is in the child's best
interests does not provide a workable formula for balancing the rights
and interests of the parties involved in termination actions. As a result,
there is a need to greatly restrict the discretion which exists throughout
the termination system. Some have argued for termination statutes
designed to focus on specific harms that the child will suffer if he remains
at home rather than on the conduct of parents.' Others have recommend-
ed that the termination order be rescinded in the event that a suitable
adoptive setting cannot be found for the child within a certain period
of time after a permanent custody order is granted. 3 The debate con-
tinues on how to decrease the potential for arbitrariness in the termina-
tion process and still ensure that the child has a continuous loving
relationship. '
One expedient solution to the problem would be to statutorily increase
the standard of proof required to permanently terminate parental rights.
The use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would symbolize the
importance of the family's integrity and serve to limit the potential for
arbitrary decision-making in termination hearings. It would also function
as a strong statement that the child's best interests are linked to the
natural family. 5 As the reasonable-doubt standard is viewed as similar
to, yet higher than, the standard of clear and convincing evidence, it would
not represent such a drastic change in the termination procedure as to
appear that the child's interests were no longer being focused upon. There
is reason to believe that the child's interests may often be jeopardized
by ill-advised termination decisions."
Upgrading the standard of proof to the reasonable-doubt standard would
help attenuate the features of the termination process which have received
the greatest criticism: lack of procedural protections and court discretion;'
broadly worded termination statutes;' evidentiary problems;' biases held
by those involved in making termination decisions;23 and an unclear best-
interests standard."' Certainly upgrading the standard of proof alone
would not correct all of the defects in the existing termination system,
but it would be a significant step in the direction of limiting the potential
for abuses.
" State Intervention, supra note 8, at 639-40.
Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 993.
Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2, at 554.
= This is the fundamental purpose behind the termination of parental rights.
For a discussion of this purpose see id. at 536-37.
Barsh, supra note 146, at 1305-06.
28 Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 994.
See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 164-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
230 Barsh, supra note 146, at 1294-96.
221 Id. at 1297-98.
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In addition to the use of the highest standard of proof in permanent
termination proceedings, legislators should alter termination statutes to
center on the specific harms a child will suffer if he remains at home
rather than on parental conduct. 2 The current emphasis on parental con-
duct may not serve the interests of the child, who is the most affected
party in a termination action.2' The use of the highest standard of proof
coupled with a statutory focus on the potential for serious injury to the
child would provide the proper balance between the fundamental right
of family integrity and the child's safety and care.
Termination statutes subject to these guidelines would need to address
the following issues: (1) a description of the injuries to the child which
would occur if he remained at home, including both serious psychological
injury and serious physical deprivation; and (2) the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights.
Incorporating these recommendations into termination statutes would
assist the state in its obligation to care for its children' M and assure the
child's right to a secure environment,235 which is to say they would uphold
the best interests of the child.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided, in Santosky v. Kramer,- that the standard
of proof for proceedings to terminate parental rights must at least be
clear and convincing evidence.237 Prior to Santosky, three standards were
used in these proceedings: preponderance of the evidence, 38 clear and
convincing evidence 39 and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
balancing tests used to arrive at the appropriate standards of proof
generally weigh factors affecting the interests of the parents, the child
and the state.24 ° A focus on the parties' interests alone ignores other
realities of the termination system24' that affect the fundamental right
22 Realistic Standards, supra note 3, at 993.
Clear and Convincing, supra note 3, at 797-99.
See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
'5 Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 2, at 536.
236 445 U.S. 745 (1982).
237 Id. at 748.
The arguments for the use of the preponderance standard focused on the
need for broad discretionary powers whenever termination is an issue. Those
favoring this standard believe it is desirable to allow a strong measure of subjec-
tivity in interpreting the facts of each case. For an example of this argument
see Note, Dependency and Termination Proceedings in California-Standards of
Proof, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1815 (1979).
239 This has been described as the "intermediate" standard. The argument for
the use of clear and convincing evidence, in termination proceedings, centers on
the need to reconcile the child's interests with the fundamental right of family
integrity. For an example of this argument, see Clear and Convincing, supra note 3.
... Id. at 797.
2.1 Balancing the interests would be appropriate for arriving at a conclusion
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of family integrity and can create problems for the child when taken from
his family. 42 When these factors are examined in terms of their impact
on termination proceedings, the usual balancing of interests becomes
inadequate.
There exists a compelling need to restrict the judicial discretion built
into the termination system and still ensure that childrens' needs are at
its heart. This objective can best be accomplished by enacting termina-
tion statutes that address the harms a child will suffer if termination is
not granted and by requiring the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof in permanent termination proceedings.
DEAN MICHAEL ROONEY
regarding the appropriate standard of proof in termination proceedings if other
realities of the termination system were not known. The problems with the types
of evidence used, vague statutes, unclear standards and the expertise of those
making the decisions militate against a simple balancing of interests. These other
factors should play a part in the determination of the appropriate standard. When
these factors are included in determining the proper standard for termination
proceedings, it becomes apparent that the highest standard should be used. For
the discussion of these other factors see supra notes 227-31 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court dealt with a number of these factors in Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
242 During hearings prior to the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, Congress learned that the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes
caused many problems for these children later in life. These problems included
alcoholism and suicide. Barsh, supra note 146, at 1290-91. These problems are
not exclusive to Indians. There is no available evidence to prove that state in-
tervention in the child's life causes successful change. Realistic Standards, supra
note 3, at 998-1020.
If a legislature were willing to fund "hard" services at an adequate
level, and if child-care workers received adequate training and utilized
the best available knowledge about child development, it might be
reasonable to pay less deference to parental autonomy and allow coer-
cive intervention .... However, under current circumstances, the costs
of coercive intervention and the lack of evidence of its effectiveness re-
quire adopting the preference for parental autonomy.
Id. at 999.
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